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Plaintiffs-AppellantsChief Consolidated MiningCompany and South Standard

Mining Company ("Plaintiffs") reply to the Brief of Appellees Sunshine Mining C^ npany
and HMC Mining, Inc. ("Sunshine") as follows:

REPLY REGARDING STATEMENT OF FACTS

In its Brief. Sunshine challenges numerous of the factual assertions in the
Brief of Appellants on the grounds that (1) the assertions were not before the District Court

in its consideration of Sunshine's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (2) they are
outside the scope of Rule 56(c). and (3) they are prejudicial and inflammatory. See Brief

of Appellees (hereinafter "Sunshine's Brief) at 7-8, Appendix A. Sunshine's arguments are
false.

First, all of the historical facts recited in Plaintiffs' initial Briefwere presented
to the District Court. The majority of those facts are alleged in the Complaint, which is a
matter of record in the District Court, and which was cited extensively to the District Court

in Chiefs Brief in Opposition to Sunshine's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Chiefs
Brief in Opposition").

(R. 1073-03.)

The remainder of the historical facts recited in

Plaintiffs' initial Brief are based on Chiefs Exhibits in Opposition to Sunshine's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment ("Chiefs Exhibits"), which were likewise filed of record in the

District Court (R.1175-1074) and discussed extensively in Chiefs Brief in Opposition
Plaintiffs* initial Brief to this Court contains thorough and precise citations to the District

Court record for all of the historical factual assertions that Sunshine now challenges.
Second, the challenged factual assertions are not outside the scope of Rule

56(c). and Sunshine has waived its right to so contend by not raising the matter in the
District Court proceedings. "Generally, when an argument has not been made in the trial

court, [this Court] will not allow it to be raised on appeal." Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire
& Casual^ Co.. 743 P.2d 1217. 1219 (Utah 1987).

For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon; we cannot merelv
assume that it was properly raised. Fhis burden is on parties
to make certain that the record they compile will adequately
preserve their arguments for review in the event of an appeal.
Id. (quoting Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah

1983)). See also Hobelman Motors. Inc. v. Allred. 685 P.2d 544. 546 (Utah 1984) (if party
does not timely object to or move to strike defective Rule 56(c) affidavits, partv waives the
right to show that they do not comply with the Rule); D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d
420. 421 (Utah 1989) (party waived evidentiary problems with Rule 56(c) affidavit bv failing
to object in the trial court). By declining to raise its Rule 56(c) challenge when corrective
action, if needed, could have been taken. Sunshine has waived its right to make the
challenge now.

Even if Sunshine's argument under Rule 56(c) had been properly preserved.
the argument still would not be well-founded

[UJnder Rule 56 .... it is not alwavs required that a party
proffer affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment in order to avoid judgment against him. . . . Rule
56(e) states specifically that a response in opposition to a
motion must be supported bv affidavits or other documents
only in order to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
fact for trial.

Olwell v. Clark, 658 P.2d 585, 586 (Utah 1982) This principle spares a non-movant from

the needless task of providing voluminous affidavits, transcripts, and documents in support
of every allegation in its pleadings where, as here, the movant has chosen to base its motion

on a single undisputed fact or legal argument.
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Judicial Administration 4-501(2)(a), Sunshine's

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment contained a recitation of undisputed facts, which consisted exclusively of
statements that true and correct copies of the Burgin Lease and the Unit Lease were

attached as exhibits, and quotes from the Leases. (R. 883-80.) Because Plaintiffs agreed
that Sunshine had correctly copied and quoted the Leases, and because Sunshine had

offered no other facts or evidence in support of its Motion, Plaintiffs had no obligation to
produce evidentiary material of their own. Olwell v. Clark, supra.
Sunshine cites four cases in support of its position that Plaintiffs may not
make reference to the disputed allegations in the Complaint in opposing Sunshine's Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317.324 (1986); D & L

Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989); Guardian State Bank v. Humphcrvs. 762
P.2d 1084, 1086 (Utah 1988); and Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1983). In
each of those cases the non-movant failed to adduce any evidence that would create a

genuine issue concerning the facts that (he moving partv asserted as uncontested, and those
uncontested facts entitled the moving partv tojudgment as a matter of law. This case presents
no such situation, because Plaintiffs agree with the few facts that Sunshine has asserted as
undisputed; Plaintiffs submit, however, that those few facts do not entitle Sunshine to

judgment as a matter of law. Where the undisputed facts do not entitle the movant to

3

judgment as a matter of law. a motion for summary judgment must be denied, and it is
irrelevant whether the non-movant has adduced any evidentiary material of its own. Olwell
v. Clark, supra.

Furthermore. Sunshine's sweeping Rule 56(c) challenge asks the Court to

disregard numerous facts that are derived from Chiefs Exhibits, which do comply with Rule
56(c). See. e^.. Brief of Appellants at 11 and Exhibit K in Chiefs Exhibits (R. 1076-^4)

(regarding Sunshine's removal of mining equipment owned bv Chief); Brief of Appellants
at 21 and Exhibit G in Chiefs Exhibits (R.1117-08) (regarding the feasibility of the Burgin
Mine project and Sunshine's insistence that a partner provide 63'/? of forward costs); Brief

of Appellants at 46 and Exhibit J in Chiefs Exhibits (R. 1089-78) (regarding Chiefs consent
to the assignment of the Unit Lease from Kennecott to HMC in reliance on Paul Hunter's

misrepresentations). Sunshine also challenges as an improper factual assertion Plaintiffs'
citation to federal administrative regulations published in the Federal Register. See Brief
of Appellants at 10. n.8 (regarding S.E.C. definitions of "proven and probable ore reserves").
And. many of the factual assertions that Sunshine wishes to have stricken are legitimate
argumentative statements that were not represented to be historical facts. See, e.g.. Brief
of Appellants at 17 ("Under the circumstances of this case, a 'miner-like' level of
development and mining work requires more than the minimum level of expenditures.");
Brief of Appellants at 18 ("Under settled principles of Utah law. Sunshine's prevarications
and mischief constitute breach of the Unit Lease irrespective of Sunshine's compliance or
non-compliance with the minimum expenditure clause in the Lease.").

Sunshine's view of Rule 56(c), Sunshine's challenge is vastly overbroad.

4

Even under

Finally, as to Sunshine's contention that the challenged statements are
inflammatory and prejudicial. Plaintiffs submit that every statement in their initial Brief is

relevant, appropriately worded, and true. Parties must be free to state their positions fairlv
and fully to an appellate court, even when that entails some prejudice or offense to the
opposing party. Plaintiffs have done nothing improper.

For all of the foregoing reasons. Plaintiffs request this Court to consider all

of the facts and arguments set forth in Plaintiffs' initial Brief in determining whether, given
the uncontested language of the Leases and the hotly contested allegations of breach.
Sunshine is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

REPLY ARGUMENT

I- Sunshine Has Made Express and Implied Covenants in the Burgin Lease that Can and
Do Impose Upon Sunshine Certain Funding, Work, and Good Faith Obligations in Excess
of and Different from Sunshine's Minimum Expenditure Obligation.

A.

Sunshine's express covenants.

1. The covenant to "provide all funds" necessary for development

Section 6.1 of the Burgin Lease states: "Sunshi^ shall provide all funds as
it in its sole mining judgment deems necessary for the exploration, development and mining
of the property."

Sunshine argues that this provision cannot be constnied to require

Sunshine to provide more than S100.000 per year, because to do so would "nullify'
Sunshine's "absolute discretion" under section 5.1 to determine the amount and character

of any work in excess of $100,000 per year. Sunshine urges the Court to give effect to every
express provision in the Lease, and to adopt a "reasonable interpretation that reconciles

apparently conflicting provisions." See Sunshine's Brief at 15-17.

The fatal flaw in Sunshine's argument is that it offers no interpretation of
section 6.1, and it reconciles any conflict between sections 5.1 and 6.1 simply by reading
section 6.1 out of the Lease. Sunshine pays lip service to the axiom that effect must be

given to every contract provision1, but Sunshine gives no effect at all to section 6.1.
Plaintiffs' initial Brief examined in detail the language and purpose of section
6.1 and the manner in which Sunshine breached the provision. See Brief of Appellants at
21-22. Sunshine's Brief offers no competing interpretation of the purpose of section 6.1.
and no argument that Sunshine has in fact "provide[ed| all funds as it in its sole mining
judgment deems necessary for the exploration, development and mining oi the property.
Sunshine apparently concedes that it has not complied with the literal command of section
6.1

Plaintiffs' initial Brief also demonstrated that Sunshine's "absolute discretion"

under section 5.1 must be circumscribed by Sunshine's enforceable

'ligations arising

elsewhere under the Burgin Lease, or else Sunshine would be permitted to avoid many of

its express obligations in the Lease on the sole ground that it has performed its minimum
expenditure obligation.

See Brief of Appellants at 23.

response to this point, either.

Sunshine's Brief contains no

Indeed, Sunshine's concept is that once it spends the

minimum amount required by section 5.2, it can use its discretion under section 5.1 to
nullify all of its obligations that require any additional expenditure of funds. Sunshine's
refusal to recognize any limit on its discretion under section 5.1 demonstrates the extreme

lengths to which Sunshine will go in seeking to avoid the requirements of section 6.1.
Plaintiffs' initial Brief also showed that Sunshine's interpretation of section 5.1

would reduce section 6.1 to meaningless surplusage, because if, as Sunshine contends.

1.
"[A] contract must be construed to give effect to every part of it, if at
all possible." Sunshine's Brief at 16 (quoting Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 723
P.2d 190, 192 (Idaho App. 1986)).
7

section 6.1 never requires more funding than section 5.2. then section 6.1 never has any
possible application. See Brief of Appellants at 23-24. Sunshine's Brief fails to meet this
point with any explanation of how section 6.1 might function under Sunshine's analysis.

This is not surprising, because only by reading section 6.1 out of the Burgin Lease can
Sunshine avoid the conclusion that it breached section 6.1.

Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Burgin Lease is reasonable and gives effect to
every provision in the Lease: (1) Under section 5.2. Sunshine must expend at least S100.000

per year on administrative, executive, or mining activities (which expenditure mav be
satisfied by a credit carried forward from past years); (2) Under section 5.1, Sunshine has

discretion to determine the amount and character of any work requiring more than the
minimum expenditure, subject to the limitation that Sunshine may not breach any of its
work or funding obligations under the Lease; and (3) Under section 6.1. once Sunshine has
exercised its discretion and has determined that certain funding is necessary to perform
exploration, development, and mining on the property. Sunshine must provide that funding
While this interpretation necessitates a qualification or limitation of Sunshine's "absolute

discretion." such a qualification is necessary to avoid the complete nullification of section
6.1 and every other provision in the Lease that requires Sunshine to provide monev.
Plaintiffs' interpretation is a reasonable and fair way to reconcile the apparent conflict
between sections 5.1 and 6.1 while still giving effect to every provision in the Lease.
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Burgin Lease is more faithful to the intent of

the parties and to the principles of contract interpretation than is Sunshine's interpretation
If there is any doubt on this point, then the Lease is ambiguous as a matter of law, because

it is "reasonably subject to two differing interpretations," Johnson Cattle Co. v. Idaho First

National Bank. 716 P.2d 1376, 1379 (Idaho App. 1986). "[I]f a contract is ambiguous, its
meaning turns on the underlying intent of the parties. Intent is a question of fact, to be
determined by a jury in light of the language of the entire agreement, the parties' conduct,
the course of prior negotiations, and other extrinsic information." Hoffman v. United Silver

Mines, Inc.. 775 P.2d 132, 137 (Idaho App. 1989).2
It is understandably tempting for a trial court to resolve a contract ambiguity

by choosing the interpretation that seems most reasonable to the court, and that is what the

District Court did in this case. But this Court must resist the temptation to perform the

function of the jury in this case. Because a reasonable person could (and should) agree with
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Burgin Lease, Plaintiffs must be given a chance to prove the
truth of their interpretation in light of all of the evidence at trial.

2.

The covenant to perform all work in a "sound miner-like manner."

Sunshine argues that the requirement of miner-like work does not impose an
obligation upon Sunshine to perform any quantity of work, because *'*- term "miner-like"

speaks only to the quality of work performed. Sunshine also argues that the miner-like

work requirement cannot obligate Sunshine to spend more than the minimum expenditure
amount, because to do so would "nullify" Sunshine's "absolute discretion" under section 5.1.
See Sunshine's Brief at 17-20.

2.
Lease § 19.2.

Idaho law governs the interpretation of the Burgin Lease. See Burgin

The primary defect in Sunshine's argument on the miner-like issue is that the

term "miner-like" does not apply solely to the quality of work performed; it also applies to

the quantity of work performed. The distinction between quantity of work and quality of
work is not as well-defined as Sunshine would wish. The obligation to perform work as a
reasonable mining company would perform requires, at a minimum, undertaking those basic
activities that a reasonable mining company would undertake. This is what Sunshine has
failed to do.

Sunshine cites two cases in support of its position that 'he term "minerlike"
pertains only to the quality of the mining work actually performed: Skaug v. Gibbs. 235 P.2d
154. 157 (Wash. 1951) and In re Grayhall Resources. Inc.. 63 B.R. 382. 383 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1986). Neither case supports Sunshine.

The "minerlike" clause involved in the Skaug case states in full as follows:

"(A]ll work must be done in a good minerlike manner with due regard to the safety.
development and preservation of said mining claims and premises as a workable mine." 235

P.2d at 157. This clause grammatically indicates that "minerlike" performance results in
development and preservation of mining claims and a workable mine, which is entirely
consistent with Plaintiffs' interpretation in this case. The court in Skaug held that the
"minerlike" clause had no bearing on the question of where certain mine tunnels were
constructed, id., which is somewhat inconsistent with Sunshine's position that the term
pertains only to the quality of work actually performed.

To the extent that Skaug is

relevant, it supports Plaintiffs, not Sunshine.

Sunshine correctly points out that in Grayhall Resources the mining lease

contained a "minerlike" work provision, and the court stated that the lessee had no
obligation to mine the property under the lease in that case. See 63 B.R. at 383. That case

did not involve, however, any dispute regarding whether the lessee was obligated to develop
the premises, or regarding the meaning of the term "minerlike." Nor did the case involve

any question regarding the relationship between the "minerlike" clause and any duty or lack

of duty to develop or mine. Contrary to Sunshine's implication in its Brief. Grayhall
Resources represents nothingmore than a coincidental appearance of the phrases "minerlike
manner" and "no obligations ... to mine" on the same page of text.
Furthermore, Sunshine has failed to address Plaintiffs' argument that the term

"minerlike" - like the terms "workmanlike" and "farmerlike" - implies a standard of
performance based on what a skilled and reasonable artisan would do under the

circumstances. See Brief of Appellants at 26. If it can be unworkmanlike or unfarmerlike

to omit activities that are reasonably necessary, then such omissions can also be
unminerlike.

Consider the analogy of a workman hired to build a house in a workmanlike

manner. The workman lays a foundation and erects a shell in a perfectly proper manner,
but he refuses to install siding, lay shingles, and otherwise finish the house. A jury surelv
would be permitted to find that this is an unworkmanlike job, despite the fact that all of the
work actually performed was workmanlike.

Consider also a farmer who fails to sow a particular field that is prime and

ready for planting, but whose performance and results in those fields that he does plant is
excellent. Again, a jury surely would be permitted to find that a covenant of "farmerlike"

il

performance has been breached, even though the work actually performed was impeccable.
These analogies illustrate that the distinction between quantity of work and
quality of work becomes blurred and is not meaningful when a job is incompletely
performed.

Sunshine has not performed the basic tasks that anv reasonable mining

company would have performed in these circumstances. It has left the Burgin Mine project
in a half finished state.

This is unminerlike. just as surely as a half finished house is

unworkmanlike and an unnecessarily fallow field is unfarmerlike.

The District Court granted a summary judgment adopting Sunshine's view of

the meaning of the term "minerlike" despite the fact that a reasonable juror could (and
should) agree with Plaintiffs' interpretation,

Fhe District Court must be reversed in this

regard, and a trial must be held so that a jurv can resolve the ambiguity and determine the
parties' true and original intent on the meaning oi the term.

B. Sunshine's implied covenants.

1. The implied covenant of reasonable diligence.

Sunshine argues that there is no implied covenant of reasonable diligence in
the Burgin Lease because the Lease contains an express agreement relating to the amount
of work required of the lessee."

Sunshine rioter that courts will not impose an implied

covenant that is contrary to an express agreement of the parties, and Sunshine argues that
an implied covenant of reasonable diligence in this case wouid "nullify" the express
agreements in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Lease

See Sunshine's Brief at 10-15.

Sunshine has cited only two Idaho cases in support of its legal argument on
this point: J. R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers. 350 P.2d 211 (Idaho 1960), and Archer v.

Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 642 P.2d 943 (Idaho 1982). Neither of these cases supports
Sunshine's position.

Sunshine cites Simplot for the proposition that an implied covenant oi
reasonableness cannot be imposed to limit a party's discretion to assign a contract. Twentyfour years after Simplot was decided, however, the Idaho Supreme Court decided Chenev

v. Jemmett. 693 P.2d 1031 (Idaho 1984). in which the court imposed a covenant of good

faith and reasonableness to limit a party's right to withhold consent to an assignment. Id.
at 1034. A dissenting justice noted that the court's ruling was "contrary to [Simplot], which
the Court neither overrules nor distinguishes, but merely ignores." Id. at 1038. To this, a
concurring justice replied: "Case law, however, is subject to change." Id- at 1036. Simplot
is no longer good law.

Sunshine cites Archer for the proposition that a merger clause precludes the

implication of a separate, implied covenant. It is undisputed that the Burgin Lease contains
no merger clause, however, so Archer is simply irrelevant. Moreover, the court in Archer

found that the merger clause defeated only the alleged implied-in-fact covenant; the court

did not even mention the merger clause in its discussion of the impiied-in-law covenant.
See 642 P.2d at 946-49.

Sunshine's legal analysis also neglects to consider that the presence or absence

13

of an express work or expenditure provision is not dispositive under the Alumet cases',

which require the implication oi a covenant of reasonable diligence whenever production
royalties are the primary consideration to the lessor. See Brief of Appellants at 29-33. The

Alumet cases contain extensive and thorough discussions of the implied covenant in mining
leases, but contain no exception of the kind that Sunshine suggests. An express work or
expenditure provision certainly is a factor to consider in determining whether production
royalties are the principal consideration to the lessor, but it is onlv one factor to consider

together with all of the other factors bearing on the "primary consideration" issue/

If a particular minimum expenditure provision indicated clearly that it was in
lieu of production royalties, then presumably production royalties could not be the primary

3.
Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 732 P.2d 679 (Idaho App.
1986)("Alumet I"); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 812 P.2d 286 (Idaho App.

1989)("Alumet II"); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co" 812 P.2d 253 (Idaho 1991)("Alumet
III").

4.
The factors that support the finding that production royalties are the
primary consideration to Chief in the Burgin Lease are discussed in Plaintiffs' initial Brief

at 32-34: (1) the Lease contains a 7-l/29? production royalty; (2) the S100.000 per year
advance royalty is non-escalating; (3) the advance royalty payments are deductible by
Sunshine from the production royalty payments; (4) the primary term of the lease is a
lengthy 50 years, with a 25 year renewal term; (5) prior to the execution of the Lease.
Sunshine led Chief to believe that Sunshine would promptly and properly conduct all work
necessary to bring the Burgin Mine back into production (see Deposition of Howard Weitz.
Exhibit E in Chiefs Exhibits, at 32-35 (R.l 129-27)); and (6) the presence of a large and rich
ore body was and is highly certain (see Sunshine Mining Company Board Minutes for

October'8-9. 1980. Exhibit D in Chiefs Exhibits (R.1134-32); Sunshine Mining Company
Press Release of October 9, 1980. Exhibit F in Chiefs Exhibits (R.l 120-19); Sunshine's
Presentation to Chiefs Board of Directors on December 15. 1988. Exhibit G

Exhibits (R.l 117-08)).
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in Chiefs

consideration to the lessor and no covenant of reasonable diligence would be implied.' But
where, as here, a minimum expenditure provision does not negate other evidence that

production royalties are the primary' consideration to the lessor, the provision cannot
preclude the imposition of the implied covenant under the Alumet cases.

Although sections 5.1 and 5.2 of the Burgin Lease are relevant in analyzing
the implied covenant issue under the Alumet cases, those provisions are woefully insufficient

to negate the possibility of an implied covenant of reasonable diligence.

As one

commentator has noted:

For the lessee to have a reasonable hope that a minimum work
clause will cause a court not to imply covenants, the clause
should contain clear language providing that in consideration of
the clause and other express provisions of the lease, the lessor
agrees that no covenants relating to exploration, development,
mining, marketing or any other matter will be implied into the

lease and that the principles of implied covenants will not be
used to construe or interpret the lease. Even then, it would be
imprudent for the lessee to assume that his lease is free from
the potential impacts of implied covenants.
M. Adams, Minimum Work Clauses in Mining Leases, 21 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 535, 548-

49 (1975); cf kb at 545. See also Ionnov. Glen-Gerv Corp., 443 N.E 2d 504, 506-07 (Ohio
1983) ("Inasmuch as the lease in question contains no express disclaimer of the covenant
to develop within a reasonable time, the instant case clearly falls within the general rule
[regarding the duty to operate with reasonable diligence].") Because sections 5.1 and 5.2
contain no language of merger or integration, no reference to the implied covenant, and no

5.
See Inman v. Milwhite. 292 I- Supp. 789, 791, 795 (E.D. Ark. 1967),
affd, 402 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1968), where the implied covenant was defeated by a lease
provision that the minimum annual royalty shall be in lieu of all development of [sic]
operation for the year for which it is paid."

suggestion that production royalties are not the principal consideration to the lessor,

sections 5.1 and 5.2 cannot preclude the imposition of the implied covenant under the
Alumet cases.

Sunshine seeks to distinguish this case from the Alumet cases on the ground

that those cases "involve leases which did not contain express covenants requiring the lessees
to explore, develop or mine." See Sunshine's Brief at 12-13. The implication of Sunshine's

argument is that the Burgin Lease does contain such an express covenant, a proposition

which Sunshine spends much of its Brief attacking. Putting aside the inconsistency in
Sunshine's argument, the point remains that the presence or absence of an express
development covenant is only one factor to consider under the controlling Alumet analysis.
The fundamental question is whether or not production royalties were the primary
consideration to the lessor.

Plaintiffs' initial Brief identifies numerous factors within and without the

Burgin Lease that support the proposition that production royalties were in fact the primary
consideration to Chief in entering into the Burgin Lease. See Brief of Appellants at 32-34.
Sunshine's Brief does not even discuss the subject.

Because the record is rife with

possibilities for Plaintiffs to prevail on this issue, it cannot be said that Sunshine must

prevail as a matter of law. The District Court's summary judgment accordingly must be
reversed.

16

2. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Plaintiffs showed in their initial Brief that Sunshine is liable for breach of the

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on Sunshine's acts of dishonesty,

refusal to deal in a joint venture, and conversion of mining equipment, irrespective of what
Sunshine's duty to mine may be. See Brief of Appellants at 36-38. Remarkably. Sunshine
has not responded to this issue at all. Sunshine's complete evasion is a tacit concession of
the validity of Plaintiffs' argument. Moreover, Sunshine's omission constitutes a failure to

file a brief on the good faith and fair dealing issue, within the meaning of Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 26(c), such that Sunshine should not be heard on this issue at oral
argument.

A reasonable juror could find that Sunshine breached its implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the Burgin Lease. This Court should reverse the District
Court's summary judgment and reinstate Chiefs claim in this regard.

II. Sunshine Has Made Express and Implied Covenants in the Unit Lease than Can and
Do Impose Upon Sunshine Certain Funding, Work and Good Faith Obligations in Excess
of and Different from Sunshine's Minimum Expenditure Obligation.

A.

Sunshine's Express Covenants.

1. The covenant to "remove all commercial ore encountered."

Article V, paragraph 7 of the Unit Lease requires Sunshine "|t]o remove.
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insofar as practicable and consistent with good mining practice, all commercial ore
encountered in exploration, development and mining operations in the Unit Tract, to the
end that said ores shall be preserved or removed and shall not be wasted or left in an

inaccessible condition." Sunshine argues that this provision cannot be construed to require
more work than the minimum work obligation without nullifying the minimum work

provision. Sunshine says further that this provision does not impose "anv manner oi time

constraint or production quota on the lessee." Sunshine proposes that the provision simply
requires Sunshine to remove ores "at whatever pace the lessee elects." See Sunshine's Brief
at 24-25.

Sunshine assumes that Plaintiffs' grievance is that Sunshine is not mining fast
enough, but the problem is not one of speed.

The problem is that Sunshine has not

adequately explored, developed, or mined the Trixie Mine or any of the numerous targets
described in the 1983 Operating Report, the 1988 Special Report, and the 1988 Resource

Inventory. See Brief of Appellants at 39-40. Sunshine's pace in many instances is as slow
as that of a dead man. Just as one would not characterize a dead man as merely having an
extremely slow pace, one should not characterize the dispute between Plaintiffs and
Sunshine as being merely one about pace.
Moreover, even if one did characterize the Unit Lease dispute as being mereK

one about the pace of mining, Plaintiffs' reliance on article V, paragraph 7 is well placed
The provision requires the removal of all commercial ores encountered "insofar as

practicable and consistent with good mining practice." This language implies a timeliness
component, which Sunshine has breached by failing to mine at a practicable pace that is

i;

consistent with good mining practice.
As for Sunshine's argument that to require Sunshine to actually remove all
commercial ore encountered would "nullify" the minimum expenditure requirement, the

answer is that the minimum expenditure requirement does not in any way limit Sunshine's
mining obligations arising elsewhere under the Lease. Article V. paragraph 1 of the Lnit

Lease imposes a minimum expenditure requirement which, like the similar provision in the
Burgin Lease, can be satisfied by non-mining expenditures, and can be satisfied by a carry

forward of excess expenditures from prior years. There is no language of limitation in the
minimum expenditure provision, and no language like the "discretion" clause upon which
Sunshine relies so heavily in the Burgin Lease context. In sum. there is no textual support
whatever in the Unit Lease for Sunshine's position that its mining obligations are subsumed
in the minimum expenditure clause.

If Sunshine's interpretation of the "remove all commercial ore" provision is

tenable, it at most creates an ambiguity that precludes summary judgment under Utah law."

See Brief of Appellants at 41. Because a reasonable person could (and should) agree with
Plaintiffs' interpretation, the District Court's judgment should be reversed in this regard.

2. The covenant to perform all work in a "minerlike fashion."

The issues and arguments here are the same as those arising under the

"minerlike" provision in the Burgin Lease. See supra pp. 9-12; Brief of Appellants at 25-27.
42-43.

Because the term "minerlike" requires a level of performance that would be

6.

The Unit Lease is governed by U'tah law.
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demonstrated by a reasonable mining company, and because a reasonable juror could (and
should) agree that Sunshine's conduct fell below this .standard, the District Court's summary
judgment was error.

B.

Sunshine's Implied Covenants.

I. The implied covenant of reasonable diligence.

Sunshine argues that there is no implied covenant of reasonable diligence in
the Unit Lease because the Utah courts will not imply a covenant that is different from or

contradictory to the parties' express agreement.

Sunshine points to the minimum

expenditure clause and the integration clause in the Unit Lease as express provisions that
are inconsistent with the implied covenant of reasonable diligence, and which would be
"nullified" if the implied covenant was imposed. See Sunshine's Brief at 10-15.
As discussed above, supra pp. 19. the minimum expenditure clause in the Unit

Lease contains no language that rules out the existence of a separate duty to develop and
mine the property. The propositions "Sunshine shall do X," and "Sunshine shall do Y." are
in no way contrary or contradictory. The existence of separate and independent obligations
is neither illogical nor unusual, as evidenced by the many cumulative obligations imposed

upon Sunshine throughout the Unit Lease (and the Burgin Lease, for that matter). The
legal implication of a covenant of reasonable diligence does not "nullify" the minimum
expenditure clause or any other of Sunshine's obligations.

Nor does the implied covenant of reasonable diligence "nullify" the integration
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clause in the Unit Lease, because the integration clause has no effect to be nullified.

Plaintiffs showed in their initial Brief that the integration clause is inoperative in this case

because: (1) The integration clause is contained in the original 1956 LJnit Lease, and not
in the 1983 amendment by which Sunshine acquired the Unit Lease; (2) Chiefs consent tc

the 1983 amendment was induced by fraud on the part of Sunshine's alter ego and agent;
and (3) the circumstances surrounding the 1983 amendment gave rise to Sunshine's implied
covenant of reasonable diligence, because the principal consideration to Chief in consenting

to the assignment was Chiefs expectation of receiving significant production royalties. See
Brief of Appellants at 43-48. Sunshine's Brief does not address any of these points. For

all of the (uncontested) reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' initial Brief, the integration clause in
the 1956 Unit Lease is not a part of the Unit Lease as amended, and does not preclude the
imposition of any implied covenant in the Unit Lease as amended.

Plaintiffs urge this Court to adopt the law of implied covenants as set forth

in the Alumet cases, and to hold that the controlling legal question respecting the implied
covenant issue is whether production royalties are the primary consideration to the lessors.

Sunshine has offered no facts or arguments on this controlling issue. Because a reasonable
person could find that production royalties are the primary consideration to Plaintiffs under

the Unit Lease,7 Sunshine is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in this regard.

7.
The factors supporting this conclusion are discussed in Plaintiffs' initial
Brief at 44-48: (1) The 1956 Unit Lease contained a 37-1/29? production royalty and no
provision for rent, advance royalties, or the like; (2) after Kennecott suspended mining
operations at the Trixie Mine in 1982, Paul Hunter sought Plaintiffs' consent for an
assignment of the Unit Lease to Mr. Hunter or a nominee company (Sunshine); (3) Mr.
Hunter represented to Chief that Sunshine would resume operations at the Trixie Mine; (4)
(continued ..)
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2. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Here, as with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the
Burgin Lease. Sunshine has simply ignored the issue. Because a reasonable person could
find that Sunshine breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Unit

Lease by various acts of dishonesty and bad faith. Plaintiffs must be permitted to pursue
their claim in this regard.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons. Plaintiffs-Appellants Chief Consolidated
Mining Company and South Standard Mining Company respectfully request this Court to
reverse the Partial Judgment and Rule 54(b) Certification entered by the District Court on
September 5, 1991. and to remand this ca>e to the District Court with instructions to

conduct a trial on Plaintiffs-Appellants' FirM. Third. Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for
Relief.

7(...continued)

When Plaintiffs consented to the assignment ot the I nit Lease to HMC (Sunshine) in 1983.
the primary term of the Lease had 23 years to run. with a fifty year renewal term at the
election of the lessee; and (5) the presence ot commercial ores was relatively certain, as
evidenced by Mr. Hunter's statements. These tacts would warrant a jury in concluding that
the primary consideration to Plaintiffs in the Unit Lease, as amended in 1983. is the
expectation that HMC (Sunshine) will generate significant production royalties.

Respectfully submitted this 10th day of June. 1992.
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